3 avril 2013
Lors d’un test, une pompe d’un circuit important pour la sûreté n’a pas démarré : cette pompe assure le refroidissement d’éléments majeurs pour la sûreté comme le circuit d’injection d’eau haute pression. En situation réelle, la perte de cette pompe aurait empêché que le processus de limitation des conséquences d’un accident survenant sur le réacteur ne se déroule correctement.
1ère divergence : juin 1985 - P : 1085 MW - Type : Mark 1
Available in english only.
Facility : FERMI - State : MI - Unit : [2] - RX Type : [2] GE-4
Event Date : 04/03/2013 - Event Time : 10:53 -
Emergency Class : NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section : 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Initial PWR : 65 % Current PWR : 65 %
COOLING WATER MAKEUP PUMP FAILED TO START DURING A SURVEILLANCE TEST
"At 1053 [EDT] on April 3, 2013, during the performance of a surveillance test on the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system the EECW system was declared inoperable due to the Division 2 EECW makeup pump failing to start during the surveillance. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room cooler.
"A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI via [Technical Specification] LCO 3.5.1. Investigation into why the makeup pump did not start is currently in progress.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on a loss of a single train safety system.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2013/20130404en.html
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