30 juin 2014
Même problème et même solution miracle que sur le site de Watts Bar. Au cours d’un réexamen hydrologique post-Fukushima, il a été identifié, le 27 juin 2014, une sous-estimation du niveau maximum de crue. Toujours sur la base de calculs sophistiqués et modernes, il n’y aurait aucun problème pour les deux réacteurs du site...
Type : PWR - Puissance : 3 455 MWth - Première divergence n° 1 : 07/1980 ; n° 2 : 11/1981
Available in english only.
Event Number : 50244
Facility : SEQUOYAH - State : TN - Unit : [1] [2] - RX Type : [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
Event Date : 06/30/2014 - Event Time : 22:46
Emergency Class : NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section : 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Initial PWR 100 % Curent PWR 100 %
Event Text
UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT COULD HAVE RESULTED IN AN INCREASED MAXIMUM FLOOD LEVEL
"On June 27, 2014, TVA identified in a reanalyzed hydrologic analysis for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) a deviation from the current hydrologic analysis. The flooding analysis in Section 2.4.3 of the SQN UFSAR assumes that the Watts Bar West Saddle Dike fails completely and instantaneously at approximately 1.5 feet of overtopping during a Peak Maximum Flood [PMF]. This assumption exists in the original design basis analysis and the revised analysis which supports SQN-TS-12-02, "Application to Revise Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Regarding Changes to Hydrologic Analysis".
"The results of recent studies of the West Saddle Dike, conducted as part of the Fukushima Order 2.1 flooding review, indicate that the complete and instantaneous failure of the Watts Bar West Saddle Dike may not be a valid assumption. If the dike does not fail, analyses performed using the codes and methods consistent with those used in original plant design show that the east floodwall of the Watts Bar Dam would overtop. As a result of this overtopping, the east floodwall is assumed to fail. Based on this assumption and analysis, failure of the east floodwall of the Watts Bar Dam would result in an increase in the flood level at the SQN Plant Site. The current licensing basis PMF level for SQN is 719.6 feet as stated in Section 2.4.2.2 of the SQN UFSAR. In addition, it should be noted that by letter dated August 10, 2012, as supplemented by letters dated April 5, 2013 and January 16, 2014, TVA proposed a revised PMF level of 722.0 feet. Introducing non failure of the Watts Bar West Saddle Dike indicated a potential increase of approximately 1.5 feet over the revised PMF level.
"TVA performed additional analysis using current industry standard for flooding analysis. Specifically, TVA modeled the condition using the United States Army Corps of Engineers Hydrologic Engineering Center River Analysis System (HEC-RAS) tool. TVA’s analysis of the condition using HEC-RAS determined that all required safety equipment for SQN would not be impacted and are considered operable based on a Prompt Determination of Operability completed on June 30, 2014.
"This report addresses a condition as described in 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B). TVA is making this report consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1022 regarding the application of engineering judgment to the evaluation of reportability of an unanalyzed condition.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition."
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