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Etats-Unis : Perry : un fusible sauté entraine la perte d’une fonction de sécurité




1er juillet 2018


Une partie du système de refroidissement d’urgence du cœur a été déclarée indisponible suite à la rupture du fusible. Ce système est unique pour limiter les conséquences d’un accident.

Le moment de la rupture du fusible semblant inconnue, le temps que le réacteur a passé sans cette partie fondamentale pour la sécurité n’est pas fourni par la NRC.

La perte du fusible a également entrainé la perte d’une partie de la logique de gestion du confinbement du réacteur ainsi que celle d’instruments de l’enceinte.

 Type : BWR Mark 3 - Puissance : 3 758 MWth - Première divergence : 8 / 1986 -

Available in english only


Event Number : 53481

Facility : PERRY - State : OH - Unit : [1] -

RX Type : [1] GE-6

Event Date : 07/01/2018 - Event Time : 00:00 [EDT]

Emergency Class : NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section : 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION

Initial PWR  : 92 % Current PWR  : 92 %

Event Text

BLOWN FUSE LEADS TO LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION

"On July 1st, 2018 at 0100 [EDT], a portion of the Division 1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) initiation logic was declared inoperable due to the discovery of a blown fuse. The fuse was replaced at 0215 on July 1st, 2018 and the Division 1 ECCS LOCA initiation logic was declared operable at 0230 on July 1st, 2018.

"The blown fuse caused the loss of a portion of the Division 1 ECCS LOCA initiation logic which would have prevented the initiation of the Emergency Closed Cooling (ECC) A system. ECC A and supported systems were declared inoperable. Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) was one of the supported systems that were declared inoperable. LPCS is considered a single train safety system. Inoperability of LPCS is considered an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The blown fuse also caused the loss of a portion of the Division 1 ECCS LOCA initiation logic which would have prevented the automatic isolation of Nuclear Closed Cooling and Instrument Air to the Containment. The loss of Containment isolation capability is considered an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2018/20180702en.html