



Source : <https://www.sortirdunucleaire.org/Etats-Unis-Quad-Cities-injection-de>

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31 octobre 2016

Etats-Unis : Quad Cities : injection de refroidissement à haute pression indisponible

Lors d'une ronde de routine, une fuite dite "mineure" à travers une paroi murale a été identifiée. La source provenait de la vanne de vidange de la canalisation de vapeur du circuit d'injection de sécurité. Selon les termes de l'autorité nucléaire américaine, le circuit reste disponible mais non exploitable... alors que cette sécurité est vitale en cas d'accident, le réacteur continue de fonctionner à pleine puissance. Une spécification technique exige que l'injection soit opérationnelle dans les 14 jours.



Type : Fukushima 1 (BWR Mark 1) - Puissance : 2 957 MWth - Première divergence : 10/1971 -

Available in english only

Event Number : 52334

Facility : QUAD CITIES

State : IL - Unit : [1] - RX Type : [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3

Event Date : 10/31/2016 - Event Time : 02:39 [CDT]

Emergency Class : NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section : 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION

Initial PWR : 100 % Current PWR : 100 %

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) INOPERABLE

"On October 31, 2016, at 0239 hours [CDT], a defect (minor audible through-wall leak) was identified on the steam line drain valve 1-2301-55, HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve. The defect was identified by Operations personnel traversing through the HPCI room as part of normal rounds. HPCI was declared inoperable under Tech Specs 3.5.1, Condition G. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was verified operable. HPCI remains available [but not operable]. The leak has been isolated. The 1-2301-55 is a manual valve downstream of the HPCI steam line drain trap. In a standby line-up, this line drains condensation from the HPCI steam supply line to the main condenser. During operation in an accident scenario, this line drains condensation from the HPCI steam supply line to the Torus via a drain pot. The location of the defect is in class 2 safety related piping.

"HPCI is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Technical Specification 3.5.1, condition G requires that HPCI be Operable within 14 days.

<https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2016/20161101en.html#en52334>